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Note: Client Fraud and the Lawyer-
An Ethical Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION'
As an officer of the court,2 a lawyer is sworn not merely to repre-
sent his client but to promote the ends of justice. It is therefore
incumbent upon the attorney to insure that his talents and skills are
not used by his client to perpetrate a fraud upon another person.3 For
a lawyer knowingly to assist his client's fraudulent intentions would,
1. This Note deals with the ethical problems that confront a lawyer when he
discovers that his client has used the professional relationship to commit a fraud
upon another person or private legal entity. As thus defined, the scope of the Note is
subject to several significant limitations:
(a) "Fraud" as used herein is not necessarily limited to common law
fraud. For a discussion of the scope of this term, see notes 70-73 infra and
accompanying text.
(b) "Client fraud" will denote only situations where the client uses the
professional relationship to commit a fraud-that is, where the professional
relationship plays a material role in accomplishing the client's deception.
Thus, if the fraud is perpetrated before the client retains the lawyer or in a
matter wholly distinct from the subject of the representation, it is not "client
fraud" as that term is used in this Note.
(c) This discussion is also limited to fraud that directly injures a person
or legal entity. Excluded, therefore, are those situations where the fraud is
only upon the court or other governmental entity. While the considerations
underlying these two situations bear significantly upon each other, the ab-
sence, in the latter case, of an actual victim makes them susceptible to and
worthy of separate analytical treatment. See note 17 infra.
(d) Finally, this discussion is limited to those situations where the de.
frauded person is unaware of the deception. The ultimate issue is the law-
yer's duty to disclose the fraud. If the injured party is already aware of the
injury, disclosure would be pointless.
2. The phrase "officer of the court" is generally used as a term of art to describe
the lawyer as a functionary of the judicial system, thus justifying the judiciary's inter-
est in regulating the practice of law. See generally Note, The Inherent Power of the
Judiciary to Regulate the Practice of Law-A Proposed Delineation, 60 MINN. L. REv.
783 (1976). For the purposes of this discussion, however, the phrase will have a broader
scope. Because the lawyer plays an essential role in our system of justice, he is given
certain rights and privileges. With these comes an obligation to the legal system-an
ethical imperative to guard the processes of justice. The Code of Professional Responsi-
bility recognizes this concept: "Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in
the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by
lawyers of their relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent
obligation of lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct." ABA
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmUMrY, Preamble.
3. Certain kinds of fraud-for example, securities fraud-are only possible with
an attorney's help. Other kinds of fraud-for example, a real estate swindle-while not
strictly requiring a lawyer's skills, are much more likely to be successful if the perpetra-
tor acts through an attorney.
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of course, be unconscionable.' Occasionally, however, the client may
be sophisticated enough to conceal his designs from the lawyer until
the deception has been consummated.5 Yet neither the fact that the
fraud has been accomplished nor the fact that his role was unwitting
can relieve the lawyer of the ethical responsibility for his participa-
tion in an injustice. In such a case, the lawyer should be obligated to
take whatever steps are necessary to rectify the situation. Initially,
of course, he must attempt to persuade the client to correct the fraud
himself.' If the client refuses, however, disclosure becomes the only
means of remedying the injustice, and the lawyer must decide
whether to reveal the facts to the injured party or to allow the injus-
tice to go unremedied.
It should be evident that a lawyer in this situation faces a very
difficult ethical decision. If he discloses the fraud, he necessarily
breaches his general duty to maintain his client's secrets and confid-
ences, 7 a duty deemed essential to the adversary system of justice.'
If, on the other hand, he acquiesces in concealing the fraud by re-
maining silent, he perpetuates the unjust situation he has helped to
create, a result that is intuitively repugnant.' Given the difficulty of
4. A lawyer who realizes that his client intends to use the professional relation-
ship to commit a fraud is obligated to withdraw from representation. See ABA CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY DR 2-110(B)(1); DR 7-102(A)(7). See also id. DR 1-
102(A)(4), (5); DR 2-110(C)(1)(a)-(c). To the extent that a lawyer is able to detect the
client's improper intentions before they are put into effect, this requirement satisfacto-
rily deals with the client fraud problem.
5. See, e.g., note 10 infra. At the point where the fraud becomes an accomplished
fact, a mere withdrawal from representation can do nothing to rectify the damage done
either to the injured party or to the lawyer's special office.
6. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1).
7. See id. DR 4-101. A partial text of DR 4-101 appears in note 35 infra.
8. See text accompanying notes 107-08 infra.
9. Intuition may appear to be a weak basis for argument. But the fact is that all
ethical judgments are ultimately rooted in intuitive notions concerning right and
wrong. This fact is often obscured by attempts to justify such judgment through
reference to precedent or to what Professor Williams refers to as "ancillary value
claims." See Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aesthetic
Regulation, 62 MINN. L. Rxv. 1, 9-11 (1977). But ultimately we cannot prove that a
particular couse of action is ethical; we must simply accept the fact, As Bernard
Williams puts it: "Moral thinking feels as though it mirrored something, as though it
were constrained to follow, rather than be freely creative. . . . For certainly the con-
sciousness of a principle . . . freely decided upon is very unlike the consciousness of a
moral principle, which is rather of something that has to be acknowledged. ' B. WIL-
LIAMS, MORALrrv: AN INTRODUCTION TO ETHics 37-38 (1972). Writing about ethics is
therefore necessarily reducible to something akin to an ipse dixit: "A is the preferred
course of action because it is right." Thus, while this Note will attack the value
judgments that underlie the Code of Professional Responsibility's disclosure rules, it
should be recognized that it does so from an intuitive basis. Reason and precedent play
a role in disputing the arguments used to support the Code's value judgment, but the
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this ethical quandary,'0 there is a need for the organized bar to pro-
utility of those tools is limited. The reader will therefore be asked to accept, by intui-
tion rather than by reason, that it is wrong to allow clients to abuse the skills of their
attorneys in an effort to defraud others. Remedying that wrong justifies a relatively
minor limitation on the principle of lawyer-client confidentiality.
10. The dilemma can perhaps best be demonstrated by example:
Example 1
A probate lawyer represents the court-appointed guardian for the person and
property of a young child whose parents died a year ago, leaving him a substantial
estate in trust. The client admits to the lawyer that he has misappropriated a consider-
able portion of the ward's estate. A bonding company is obligated as surety to restore
the misappropriated funds if a timely claim is brought to its attention. (This example
is based on the facts in ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIoNs, No. 1778 (1964)
(Informal Opinion), compiled in 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INFORMAL ETiuCS
OPINIONS 373 (1975). See text accompanying notes 24-27 infra.)
Example 2
The facts are the same as Example 1, except that the lawyer learns of the misap-
propriated funds from his client's close friend, to whom the client admitted the fraud
in confidence.
Example 3
A homeowner retains a lawyer to represent him in connection with the sale of his
house. During preliminary negotiations with a prospective purchaser, the client repre-
sents that the electrical wiring is newly installed, that the basement is watertight, and
that the house is generally in excellent condition. In apparent reliance upon these
representations, the two parties agree to a purchase price. After the sale is consum-
mated, the lawyer receives a phone call from his client's neighbor, who reports that
the client recently told him that the roof of the house is in need of substantial repair,
that the electrical wiring is old and in defective condition, and that the basement fills
with several inches of water during heavy rains. The neighbor explains that he is
conveying this information because he knows the lawyer was involved in the transac-
tion and because he has good reason to believe that the client misrepresented these
facts to the purchaser. The purchaser is unaware of the defects in his new home. (This
example is discussed in Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of
Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RtroEms
L. REv. 332, 388-89 (1976).)
Example 4
The lawyer representing a corporation that has recently completed a large public
stock offering discovers that much of the information he used in drafting the prospec-
tus was misleading and that several of the company's officers and directors were fully
aware of the deception from the beginning. Moreover, the financial information about
the corporation disclosed in the prospectus was so far from the truth that the newly
issued stock is grossly overvalued. Only the lawyer and the persons involved are aware
of the fraud.
The client fraud dilemma presents unique problems in a securities law context
since, in addition to any ethical duty to disclose mandated by the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility, securities lawyers may also find themselves subject to a
legal duty to reveal information about their client's fraudulent actions. It is possible,
for example, that a lawyer may be held civilly or criminally liable for aiding and
abetting stock fraud if he fails to report a violation of the securities laws in which he
has played a role. See, e.g., SEC v. National Student Mktg., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C.
1975). Securities lawyers, understandably concerned about this new development in
the law, have reacted critically to all mandatory disclosure rules for client fraud infor-
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mulgate and enforce an understandable and ethically sound rule gov-
erning professional behavior in such situations. Unfortunately, the
American Bar Association (ABA), after struggling for years with the
client fraud dilemma, has been unable to draft such a rule. Instead,
the current standard mandated by the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility is confused, badly reasoned, and most important, ethically un-
satisfying." This Note will trace the evolution of the ABA's response
to the problem of client fraud, analyze the current solution prescribed
by the Code, and propose an alternative rule that would better recon-
cile the conflicting ethical requirements that confront a lawyer upon
discovering his client's fraud.
II. HISTORY OF THE ABA'S ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH
THE CLIENT FRAUD DILEMMA
A. THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS
In 1908, the ABA adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics, the
first attempt to prescribe nationally applicable rules of professional
conduct for lawyers. The lawyer's responsibility upon learning of his
client's fraud was set out in Canon 41:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he
should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if
his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he
should promptly inform the injured party or his counsel, so that they
may take appropriate steps. 2
mation. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF Ac'nON OF THE HOUSE OF DI, -
GATES: ANNUAL MEETING 31 (1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA HOUsE AcTION]; Gold-
berg, Ethical Dilemma: Attorney-Client Privilege v. The National Student Marketing
Doctrine, 1 SEc. REG. L.J. 297 (1974); Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A
New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 437 (1974). See generally note 53 infra.
11. According to DR 7-102(B)(1), the lawyer in each of the examples enumerated
in note 10 supra would be ethically bound to keep secret any information about his
client's fraud. Moreover, in nearly every realistic client fraud situation, the ABA Code,
far from requiring the lawyer to correct the injustice by disclosing the deception,
threatens him with disciplinary action if he attempts to inform the injured party of
his client's fraud. See text accompanying notes 82 & 93-97 infra. It is the position of
this Note that such a result is inconsistent with the Code's earlier insistence that
lawyers are obligated "to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct." See note
2 supra.
12. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmics No. 41. Canon 41 was added to the
Canons in 1938. AMERIcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMIlrFEE ON 131OFES -
SIONAL ETHICS 181 (1967). Other Canons also applied to the client fraud problem,
although tangentially. See, e.g., ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcS No. 15 ("The
office of attorney does not permit, much less does it demand of him for any client,
violation of law or any manner of fraud or chicane."); No. 22 (lawyer's duty of candor
and fairness); No. 29 (lawyer's duty to uphold the honor of the profession).
[Vol. 62:89
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Standing alone, Canon 41 provided an unequivocal mandate to reveal
a client's fraud to the injured party if the client refused to remedy
the injustice himself. If was not, however, the only provision govern-
ing the lawyer's conduct in this situation. Other Canons recognized
the importance of confidentiality in the lawyer-client relationship,
and Canon 37 specifically directed the lawyer to preserve his client's
confidences. 13 Thus, in those situations where the lawyer learned
of the client's deception from a confidential communication," he
would have to choose between the two conflicting Canons. Far from
resolving the client fraud dilemma, the Canons, literally interpreted,
imposed directly contradictory requirements on the lawyer, in effect
threatening him with possible disciplinary action no matter what he
chose to do.
This unsatisfactory situation prompted several inquiries to the
ABA Committee on Professional Ethics." Finally, in 1953, the
13. It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his employees;
and neither of them should accept employment which involves or may in-
volve the disclosure or use of these confidences, either for the private advan-
tage of the lawyer or his employees or to the disadvantage of the client,
without his knowledge and consent, and even though there are other avail-
able sources of such information. A lawyer should not continue employment
when he discovers that this obligation prevents the performance of his full
duty to his former or to his new client.
If a lawyer is accused by his client, he is not precluded from disclosing
the truth in respect to the accusation. The announced intention of a client
to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he is bound
to respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be necessary to
prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHcs No. 37.
In addition, Canon 6 referred to "[the lawyer's] obligation to represent the client
with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences... ." Id. No. 6.
14. The Canons did not define the term "confidence." Presumably the word
referred to information that would be protected by the attorney-client privilege under
state law. Cf. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBLIrY DR 4-101 (A) (so defining the
term in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility). The text of DR 4-101(A) appears
in note 35 infra.
15. What is currently known as the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, in existence since 1913, has also been known as the Standing Commit-
tee on Professional Ethics and the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances.
The Ethics Committee has been charged, inter alia, with interpreting the Canons and
rendering opinions as to proper professional conduct in given situations. The Ethics
Committee issues both Formal and Informal Opinions. Formal Opinions involve ques-
tions that arise frequently and that are of general interest. Informal Opinions involve
questions that arise comparatively infrequently and that are narrower in scope. Formal
Opinions issued before 1967 are compiled in AMmmcm BAR ASSOCIArION, OPWIOiNS OF
TM CoMMMrr ON PROFESSIONAL ETIcs (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA OPINioNs].
Those Formal Opinions issued after 1967 have not yet been officially compiled and in
this Note will be cited to the slip opinions. Informal Opinions issued before 1975 are
19771
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Committee issued Opinion 287, its first attempt to deal with the
client fraud dilemma. 6 The Opinion involved a lawyer who had rep-
resented the husband in a divorce action in which a decree was
granted on the ground of willful desertion and abandonment by the
client's wife. Three months later, the client informed the lawyer that
he had misrepresented the duration of the wife's desertion and thus
had not been legally entitled to a divorce on that basis. The wife, who
had colluded in the perjury, was now threatening to reveal the fraud
to the court because the client was behind in his support payments.
A state bar association requested the Ethics Committee's opinion
concerning whether the lawyer had an obligation to reveal the perjury
to the court. 7
The Ethics Committee first determined that Canon 37
"embodied" the common law evidentiary privilege of nondisclosure
for confidential communications between lawyer and client. '8 Tracing
the history of the privilege, the Committee reasoned that the lawyer's
obligation to maintain confidentiality, part of the very foundation of
the adversary system, was essential to the administration of justice.'"
Since the client's communication to the lawyer did not come within
any of the explicit exceptions to the general requirement of confiden-
compiled in the two volume AMmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION, INFORMAL ETHICS OPINIONS
(1975) [hereinafter cited as ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS].
16. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953), in ABA
OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 633. There were prior opinions dealing with client miscon-
duct, see, e.g., id., No. 274 (1946), in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 608; No. 268
(1945), in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 596; No. 216 (1941), in ABA OPINIONS, supra
note 15, at 503; No. 202 (1940), in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 486; No. 156 (1936),
in ABA OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 427; No. 155 (1936), in ABA OPINIONS, supra note
15, at 426; No. 87 (1932), in ABA OPINONS, supra note 15, at 335; but none addressed
the type of client fraud with which this Note is concerned.
17. Since the wife colluded in the perjury, the client's fraud was perpetrated
solely against the court. Therefore, the factual situation addressed in Formal Opinion
287 is not an example of the type of client fraud dealt with in this Note. See note I
supra. Nevertheless, Opinion 287 has played an important role in the evolution of the
ABA's position on client fraud and thus bears on the issues addressed herein.
Arguably, client fraud against a tribunal is qualitatively different from client
fraud against a person. In both situations, the client's use of the lawyer to perpetrate
a deception entails an abstract harm to the legal system. In the latter case, however,
there is additional, palpable harm to an identifiable person. The moral imperative for
disclosure by the lawyer is therefore necessarily stronger in the case of a fraud against
a person. Only this more compelling situation is discussed in this Note. See note 113
infra.
18. ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953), in ABA
OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 635. For a discussion of the impropriety of relying on
the evidentiary privilege to support a rule of lawyer-client confidentiality in a client
fraud context, see notes 99-106 infra and accompanying text.
19. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953), in ABA
OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 6.35.
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tiality imposed by Canon 37,1 the Committee concluded that the
lawyer would have a duty to remain silent unless disclosure was spe-
cifically required by some other Canon or policy consideration.2
Turning to Canon 41, the Committee decided that Canon 37 should
take precedence over the competing duty of disclosure there im-
posed,2 and that in any event: "We do not believe that Canon 41 was
directed at a case such as that here presented but rather at one in
which, in a civil suit, the lawyer's client has secured an improper
advantage over the other party through fraud or deception."1'
This interpretation of Canons 37 and 41 was followed eleven
years later in Informal Opinion 778,24 which concerned a lawyer who
represented a court-appointed guardian of the person and property
of a minor. The guardian revealed to the lawyer that he had misap-
propriated a substantial part of the ward's estate. The lawyer re-
quested the Ethics Committee's opinion concerning his duty to report
the fraud either to the court or to the bonding company that would
make good the losses if informed. The Committee, expressly adopting
the reasoning of Opinion 287, resolved the conflict between the Can-
ons in favor of the confidentiality requirement. It held that the
lawyer was not obligated to report the fraud and that to do so would
constitute a violation of Canon 37.2 Unfortunately, the Committee
ignored a crucial factor distinguishing the situation before it from
that presented in Opinion 287-the existence of a third party who had
been injured by the client's fraud. In fact, the Committee treated the
situation as if it were merely a conflict between the requirement of
confidentiality and the need to avoid frauds upon the court:
True it is that the attorney, as an officer of the court, owes a duty
to the court which appointed the guardian and that a minor child
20. See ABA CANONS OF PaOFESSIONAL ETHics No. 37. The text of Canon 37
appears in note 13 supra.
21. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953), in ABA
OPINIoNs, supra note 15, at 636.
22. "We do not consider . . .[Canon 411 sufficient to override the purpose,
policy, and express obligation under Canon 37." Id. at 637. Since the Committee held
that Canon 41 did not apply to the fact situation before it, see note 23 infra and
accompanying text, it was unfortunate that they made such a broad value judgment
without attempting to justify it. It was even more unfortunate that this decision was
followed without question in Informal Opinion 778, dealing with an entirely different
factual situation. See notes 24-27 infra and accompanying text.
23. ABA CoiAM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 287 (1953), in ABA
OPINIONs, supra note 15, at 636. As a further ground for its decision, the Committee
held that neither the divorce court nor the state (as an interested party in all divorce
actions) qualified as an injured party under Canon 41. Id. See generally note 17 supra.
24. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmICS, OPINIONS, No. 1778 (1964) (Informal
Opinion), in 1 ABA INFORMAL OPINIONS, supra note 15, at 373.
25. Id. at 374.
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is under the special protection of the court, but it was the guardian
who employed the attorney and the guardian and not the ward is
the client of the attorney.2 '
The Committee ruled that the lawyer should advise the client to
rectify the fraud and that, if the client refused to do so, the lawyer
should withdraw from representation." In no event, however, was the
lawyer to attempt to rectify the fraud by disclosing it to the court or
the bonding company.
After Opinion 287 and Informal Opinion 778, a lawyer's duty
when confronted with client fraud was relatively clear. It was only in
those few situations in which the client had injured another person
by perpetrating a fraud in a civil suit that the disclosure duty im-
posed by Canon 41 could even arguably take precedence over the duty
of confidentiality." Faced with any other client fraud, the lawyer was
always to follow Canon 37's obligation of confidentiality. This was the
ABA's position on client fraud until the 1969 adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.29
B. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
In 1964, the ABA created the Special Committee on Evaluation
of Ethical Standards to investigate the need for revising the Canons.
Because defects in the Canons could not be cured by minor revi-
sions,"0 the Committee's work eventually led to the promulgation of
a new standard of conduct for lawyers: the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. Surprisingly, although the Code generally integrated the
provisions of the Canons, the Preliminary Draft of the Code did not
contain a client fraud disclosure rule similar to Canon 41.1' After the
Preliminary Draft was distributed to the legal community for com-
26. Id. (emphasis added).
27. But see note 5 supra.
28. Thus, if in a divorce action the client gained a more favorable property
settlement by perjuring himself, Canon 41 may have compelled disclosure. The Ethics
Committee, however, was never confronted with any situation in which they found
Canon 41 to apply; after Informal Opinion 778, this is the most Canon 41 could have
meant. It is not clear why a fraud perpetrated in the context of a civil suit should de-
mand disclosure, while a fraud committed outside of court should not.
29. Informal Opinion 778 was the Ethics Committee's last attempt to deal with
the client fraud dilemma until after the promulgation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility in 1969.
30. See Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and
Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1970).
31. The omission may have been intentional: "Perhaps the omission was due to
the committee's consideration of the high fiduciary duty owed by lawyer to client and
consideration of the firm support found in the law of evidence for the attorney-client
privilege." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 2,
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1543 (1975).
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ment, several lawyers objected that the substance of Canon 41 was
not represented." In response, DR 7-102(B) was added to the Code
before its adoption in August 1969. At that time, DR 7-102(B)(1)
provided:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that [hiis
client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud
upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected party or tribunal.13
Although the language of DR 7-102(B) did not differ greatly
from that of Canon 41,11 when interpreted in conjunction with DR
4-101, its impact was striking. DR 4-101, the successor to Canon 37,
generally requires that a client's confidences and secrets be preserved
by the lawyer.35 DR 4-101(C), however, exempts the attorney from
this confidentiality requirement when disclosure is "permitted under
[other] Disciplinary Rules . . . ." Since DR 7-102(B)(1), as origi-
nally enacted, permitted-indeed, required-disclosure of informa-
tion clearly establishing client fraud, a lawyer receiving such infor-
mation was obligated to reveal it, notwithstanding the general duty
of confidentiality imposed by DR 4-101. Thus, despite its facial simi-
larity to Canon 41, DR 7-102(B) went much further in requiring dis-
closure of client fraud.35
32. Telephone interview with Professor John Sutton, Reporter for the Special
Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards (Dec. 22, 1976).
33. ABA CODE OF PROFssoNAL RsPoNstaumrr DR 7-102(B)(1)(amended 1974).
DR 7-102(B)(2) requires a lawyer to reveal information about frauds committed by
persons other than his clients and thus is not within the scope of this Note.
34. There are a few minor differences. Whereas Canon 41 referred to fraud involv-
ing unjust enrichment ("if his client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly
gained"), DR 7-102(B) applies to client fraud generally. Moreover, DR 7-102(B)
applies only if the lawyer receives information "clearly establishing" the fraud, while
Canon 41 only required that the lawyer "discover" the fraud. Finally, unlike Canon
41, DR 7-102(B) specifically provides for disclosure to a defrauded tribunal, thus ex-
pressly removing one of the bases for the holding in Opinion 287. See note 23 supra.
35. (A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-
client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other informa-
tion gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be
held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be
likely to be detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted by DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
ABA CODE OF PROFEs sIONAL REsPONSmILrr DR 4-101(A)-(B)(1). For the exceptions to
the general rule of confidentiality, see id. DR 4-101(C). The text of DR 4-101(C)
appears in note 56 infra.
36. "DR 7-102 represents a significant expansion of the limited duty to reveal
formerly required under the A.B.A. Canons of Professional Ethics . . . ." Lipman,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The new standard was not, however, readily accepted by the
legal community. In March 1971, the ABA indicated that the DR 7-
102(B) duty to reveal should not apply to a lawyer whose client gave
false testimony in a criminal case." In 1972, following a referendum
of the District of Columbia Bar, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, wholly rejected the requirement that a lawyer should reveal
his client's fraud .3 Several states adopted different versions of DR 7-
102(B), limiting its effect in various ways .3 Finally, in February 1974,
the ABA amended DR 7-102(B)(1) to exempt from mandatory disclo-
sure any information "protected as a privileged communication."" In
its first opinion interpreting the new amendment, the Ethics Com-
mittee acknowledged that the change reflected a conscious choice of
supra note 10, at 454. But see A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
147 (1976), suggesting that "it seems more likely" that the drafters of the Code in-
tended to maintain the tension between confidentiality and disclosure duties that had
existed under the Canons, "leaving lawyers, ethics committees, and courts the problem
of resolving the conflict in different factual situations." This analysis, of course, ignores
the fact that the Code, unlike the Canons, expressly provides for an exception to the
general duty of confidentiality when client fraud is involved. See ABA CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2), DR 7-102(B)(1).
37. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION,
Defense Function § 7.7, Commentary at 274-77 (Approved Draft 1971).
38. In the referendum 74% of the District of Columbia Bar voted to reject a duty
to reveal a client's fraud. On April 1, 1972, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
emasculated DR 7-102(B)(1) as applied to District of Columbia attorneys by eliminat-
ing the clause requiring the lawyer to reveal his client's fraud "if his client refuses or
is unable to do so." See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 28.
29, 257-59 (1975). In the District of Columbia, therefore, a lawyer, upon learning of his
client's fraud, has a duty to call upon the client to rectify the situation. Should the
client refuse, the lawyer's duty is at an end. No revelation by the lawyer is permitted,
much less required.
39. See generally Lipman, supra note 10, at 455 & n.89. For example, Washing-
ton requires disclosure when the client has defrauded a tribunal and permits disclosure
when the client has defrauded another person. WASHINGTON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(B)(1) (adopted Dec. 7, 1971, effective Jan. 1, 1972), in WAsH.
CT. R. ANN. (Supp. 1974). Since the policies'in favor of disclosure are necessarily
stronger in the case of a fraud against a person, see note 17 supra, this rule is at least
arguably anomalous.
40. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY OF ACTION TAKEN BY THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES: MIDYEAR MEETING 3 (1974). DR 7-102(B)(1) now provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that [his] client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or
tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his
client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis added). The
amended rule took effect March 1, 1974.
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confidentiality over disclosure: "[The confidential privilege, in our
opinion, must be upheld over any obligation of the lawyer to betray
the client's confidence in seeking rectification of any fraud that may
have been perpetrated by his client upon a person or tribunal.""
The adoption of the 1974 amendment seemed, then, to settle the
client fraud controversy. The exception relieved the lawyer of any
obligation to reveal information that would be protected by the
attorney-client privilege. Where, however, the information was not so
protected, it was commonly felt that the duty to disclose would gov-
ern.42 Thus read, the amended rule was thought to preserve the law-
yer's general obligation to reveal client fraud, while at the same
time protecting any privileged communication between the client
and the lawyer.
C. OPINION 341
Notwithstanding the commentators' consistent interpretations
of the 1974 amendment, there was still a measure of uncertainty in
the legal community concerning the scope of the privileged communi-
cation exception. After receiving several inquiries, the ABA Ethics
Committee, in Opinion 341, ruled that the clause should be extended
to protect confidences and secrets from disclosure without regard to
whether the particular information would be protected under the
attorney-client privilege. This interpretation was based on the Com-
mittee's analysis of three interrelated topics: the legislative history
of DR 7-102(B), the policy considerations behind the attorney-client
privilege, and the practical problems inherent in defining the privi-
leged communication clause in terms of the privilege.
As the Ethics Committee read the legislative history, the drafters
had not realized the effect DR 7-102(B) (1) would have in conjunction
41. ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETmCS, OPMIONS, No. 11314 (Informal Opin.
ion), slip op. at 2 (1975).
42. See, e.g., Callan & David, supra note 10, at 361-62 (footnote omitted):
The amended language resolves any pre-existing conflict by rendering DR 7-
102(B)(1) inapplicable if the information disclosing the past fraud is pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege ...
[But if] the information evidencing the client's past fraud is im-
parted to the attorney by a third person or discovered by the attorney himself
wholly outside the context of the attorney-client relationship (sluch infor-
mation will clearly not be privileged, and [the exception clause tol DR 7-
102(B)(1) will not bar disclosure.
See generally Lipman, supra note 10, at 454: '"The apparent purpose of the 1974
amendment was to avoid the quandary confronting a lawyer who receives knowledge
of his client's fraud by virtue of a communication privileged under state law."
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with DR 4-101(C)(2). 3 In the Committee's opinion, the privileged
communications exception to DR 7-102(B)(1) was necessary to free a
lawyer from the dilemma of being required, in certain instances, to
disclose information that he also was required by the law of evidence
not to reveal.4 In other words, the exception for privileged communi-
cations was adopted in order to resolve what the Committee saw to
be an irreconcilable conflict between the law of evidence and the
original version of DR 7-102(B)(1). 5 The Committee felt that by ex-
plicitly excepting privileged communications from the duty imposed
by DR 7-102(B)(1), the 1974 amendment represented a conscious
policy choice by the ABA-a decision that the principle of lawyer-
client confidentiality was more important than the lawyer's duty to
rectify frauds perpetrated by his client.
The Ethics Committee recognized that Opinion 287 had dealt
with the client fraud quandary in a similar manner:"I
One effect of the 1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1) is to rein-
state the essence of Opinion 287 which had prevailed from 1953 until
1969. It was as unthinkable then as now that a lawyer should be
subject to disciplinary action for failing to reveal information which
by law is not to be revealed without the consent of the client and
the lawyer is not now in that untenable position. The lawyer no
longer can be confronted with the necessity of either breaching his
client's privilege at law or breaching a disciplinary rule."
In determining the scope of the privileged communication amend-
ment to DR 7-102(B)(1), however, the Ethics Committee went well
beyond "the essence of Opinion 287," which had only excused the
lawyer from disclosure of client fraud when he learned of the fraud
through a communication that would be protected under the
attorney-client privilege. The Committee reasoned that a broader
interpretation of the privileged communication clause was necessary
in order to protect the important policies behind the tradition of
lawyer-client confidentiality:
The tradition (which is backed by substantial policy considera-
tions) that permits a lawyer to assure a client that information
43. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 2.
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1543 (1975).
44. Id.
45. But see note 47 infra.
46. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
47. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 3,
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1543-44 (1975). Note that the very existence of any
conflict depends on the assumption that disclosure of information about the client's
fraud would breach the attorney-client privilege. This assumption is unwarranted. See
notes 99-106 infra and accompanying text.
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(whether a confidence or a secret) given to him will not be revealed
to third parties is so important that it should take precedence, in
all but the most serious cases, over the duty imposed by DR 7-
102(B). 49
The Committee therefore felt that it would be undesirable to
limit the application of the privileged communication exception to
information protected by the attorney-client privilege. First, such a
limitation would make the lawyer's ethical duty dependent upon the
rules of evidence in each particular jurisdiction,4' and the Committee
apparently thought it somewhat incongruous to impose different
standards of ethical behavior on attorneys in different states.10 Sec-
ond, the Committee submitted that such an interpretation would
entail difficulties in determining which jurisdiction's evidentiary rule
would be applied in a particular case.' Finally, the Committee sug-
gested that to define the exception clause in terms of the evidentiary
privilege could raise problems as to the difference between a waiver
of the privilege by the client and his consent to the lawyer's disclosure
of a confidence. 52 Because of these supposed practical problems, and
48. ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETwcs, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 4.
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544 (1975). This sentence captures the essence of
Opinion 341. Notwithstanding the Committee's resolute reliance on the attorney-client
privilege elsewhere in the Opinion, see, e.g., text accompanying notes 44 & 47 supra,
it here explicitly recognizes that it is a tradition that militates against disclosure and
not a rule of law. Therefore, since the Committee is essentially making a value judg-
ment that the "substantial policy considerations" supporting the tradition of attorney
confidentiality should take precedence over the lawyer's duty to reveal his client's
fraud even in those situations where such information would only be a secret and not
a confidence, it might have been desirable to explain (1) what those policy considera-
tions are, see, e.g., text accompanying note 108 infra, (2) why they are thought impor-
tant enough to require the lawyer to acquiesce in concealing his client's deception, and
(3) exactly what client fraud situations qualify as "the most serious cases."
49. ABA CoMM. ON PROFmSSIONAL ETmIcs, OPINIoNs, No. 341, slip op. at 4-5,
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544 (1975).
50. Since different standards of ethical conduct are already imposed in
different states, see note 65 infra and accompanying text, the Committee's concern
here seems unwarranted.
51. "There may be significant problems in knowing which jurisdiction's eviden-
tiary rule would be applied in a given case and the scope of that privilege may vary
widely among jurisdictions." ABA Com. ON PROFSmioNAL Emcs, OPINIONS, No. 341,
slip op. at 5, reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544 (1975). Here again the Committee's
concern seems misplaced since lawyers are well accustomed to dealing with such
conflict-of-law problems in other contexts.
52. Id. The attorney-client privilege can be waived by the client in various ways.
"Waiver includes. . . not merely words or conduct expressing an intention to relin-
quish a known right, but conduct, such as a partial disclosure, which would make it
unfair for the client to insist on the privilege thereafter." C. McCoRnscK, EvMNcE §
93, at 194 (2d ed. 1972). What constitutes the client's consent to his lawyer's disclosure
of a confidence or a secret is set forth in DR 4-101(C)(1): "A lawyer may reveal
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because of the perceived importance of lawyer-client confidentiality,
the Committee interpreted the 1974 exception clause in the broadest
possible manner: "The balancing of the lawyer's duty to preserve
confidences and to reveal frauds is best made by interpreting the
phrase 'privileged communication' in the 1974 amendment to DR 7-
102(B) as referring to those confidences and secrets that are required
to be preserved by DR 4-101."13
At first glance, this definition appears to settle the vexing ques-
tion of when a lawyer should disclose a client's fraud by prescribing
a simple test: if the information is required to be preserved by DR 4-
101, it is not subject to the DR 7-102(B) disclosure duty. But a closer
inspection of DR 4-101 and its exceptions reveals some significant
ambiguities in this standard. DR 4-101(A) broadly defines "confid-
ence" and "secret,"5 and DR 4-101(B) imposes a general requirement
that the lawyer not knowingly reveal information that fits within
those definitions.5 DR 4-101(C), however, sets out four exceptions to
this general duty of confidentiality. A confidence or secret is "re-
confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but only after
a full disclosure to them." Thus, the client could waive the protection of the attorney-
client privilege (for example, by telling the lawyer about the fraud in the presence of
a third person) without consenting to disclosure by the lawyer. Nevertheless, it is
unclear what problems the Committee felt would arise from this distinction. If the
privileged communications clause is limited to that information that would be pro-
tected by the privilege, consent is never a factor in determining the disclosure duty.
The duty to disclose would arise whenever the information was not protected by the
privilege, regardless of whether the client has consented to its disclosure.
53. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 4,
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544 (1975) (emphasis added).
It may be of historical significance that the Ethics Committee apparently issued
this broad interpretation in response to pressure from the securities bar. Securities
lawyers at that time were extremely concerned because of the SEC's complaint in the
National Student Marketing case, see discussion following Example 4, note 10 supra.
which charged several lawyers with aiding and abetting their client's stock fraud by
failing to report the deception when it came to their attention. It is not clear how the
securities bar thought a change in the Code of Professional Responsibility would affect
their legal duty to disclose under the securities laws. They may have intended to use
the change in DR 7-102(B)(1) as a precedent in arguing against the imposition by the
SEC of a legal duty to disclose. See ABA HousE Ac'nON, supra note 10, at 31 (ABA
Corporation, Banking and Business Law Section asserting that SEC policy on client
fraud should conform to amended DR 7-102(B)(1)).
54. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A). The text of DR
4-101(A) appears in note 35 supra. These definitions are so broad that virtually any
information clearly establishing a fraud by the client would fit within one or the other
of them. See text accompanying notes 83-92 infra.
55. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B). The relevant
portion of DR 4-101(B) appears in note 35 supra.
56. (C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected,
but only after a full disclosure to them.
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quired to be preserved by DR 4-101," therefore, only when none of
these four exceptions applies. Conversely, if one of the exceptions is
applicable, the information may be disclosed. Thus, if information
establishing a client fraud falls within one of the exceptions in DR 4-
101(C), a lawyer who receives such information would be obliged
under DR 7-102(B)(1) to reveal it, the privileged communication
clause notwithstanding.Y
Construing the privileged communication clause in terms of DR
4-101, however, presents substantial definitional problems because
DR 4-101(C)(2) specifically allows disclosure of confidences and se-
crets "when permitted under Disciplinary Rules . . . ." Conse-
quently, a lawyer who consults the Code (as interpreted by Opinion
341) to determine whether he has a duty to reveal information estab-
lishing that his client has committed a fraud will obtain the following
circular response. Under DR 7-102(B), he must disclose his client's
fraud 8 unless he learned of it through a privileged communication.
A privileged communication is any confidence or secret required to
be preserved by DR 4-101. Confidences and secrets are not required
to be preserved by DR 4-101-and hence by definition are not "privi-
leged communications"-if another Disciplinary Rule permits disclo-
sure. DR 7-102(B) permits-indeed, requires-disclosure of informa-
tion establishing client fraud unless the information was received
through a privileged communication. A privileged communication is
any confidence or secret required to be preserved by DR 4-101-that
is, any confidence or secret not subject to a DR 4-101(C) exception.
Evidently, a lawyer will never be able to determine his ethical
duty regarding client fraud since, after Opinion 341, his obligation to
reveal the fraud under DR 7-102 is contingent upon his duty of confi-
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or re-
quired by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information neces-
sary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.
ABA CODE OF PoFEssioNAL REsPoSsmrry DR 4-101(C).
57. The Committee explicitly recognizes this: "DR 4-102[sic](C) sets out sev-
eral circumstances under which the revelation of a secret or confidence is permissible,
and thus in cases where these exceptions apply, DR 7-102(B) may make the optional
disclosure of information under DR 4-101 a mandatory one." ABA Co-tMM. ON PaoFEs-
SioNAL ETmcs, OPMuONS, No. 341, slip op. at 4, reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544
(1975).
58. This statement assumes, of course, that the other elements of DR 7-102(B)
are satisfied: the client's conduct constituted "fraud"; the fraud took place "during
the course of the representation"; the fraud was "clearly established." For a discussion
of how these terms should be defined, see notes 69-78 infra and accompanying text.
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dentiality under DR 4-101, while the scope of the confidentiality obli-
gation imposed by DR 4-101 is contingent upon the DR 7-102 disclo-
sure duty. This circularity results from the Committee's failure to
state whether the DR 4-101(C)(2) exception for disclosure "permit-
ted under [other] Disciplinary Rules" is still to be applied in inter-
preting DR 7-102(B)(1). If it is, of course, the privileged communica-
tion exception is meaningless. Any information otherwise satisfying
DR 7-102(B) cannot be a privileged communication; if DR 7-102(B)
permits disclosure, the information is by definition not "required to
be preserved by DR 4-101."
It is difficult to understand how the Ethics Committee failed to
recognize this problem since it was the interaction between DR 7-
102(B) and DR 4-101(C)(2) that prompted adoption of the privileged
communication clause in the first place.59 Nevertheless, it is obvious
that the Committee intended to broaden the privileged communica-
tion exception rather than render it meaningless. The Committee
may have meant to exempt from mandatory disclosure all
confidences and secrets as those terms are defined in DR 4-101(A).10
This interpretation, however, would conflict with the explicit state-
ment in Opinion 341 that certain confidences and secrets would still
be subject to disclosure under the amended version of DR 7-102(B)."6
Alternatively, the Opinion could be read as making only that
part of DR 4-101(C)(2) that deals with other Disciplinary Rules"!
inapplicable to the client fraud situation. In that case confidences
and secrets would always be preserved except where disclosure is re-
quired by law or court order.13 Under such a reading, of course, the
privileged communication "exception" all but swallows the "rule"
mandating disclosure. But since this is the only interpretation that
is neither meaningless nor in direct conflict with other language in
the Opinion, it must be the result the Committee intended to reach
and thus represents the ABA's current position on the client fraud
dilemma.
59. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
60. The text of DR 4-101(A) appears in note 35 supra.
61. "For example, when disclosure is required by a law, the 'privileged communi-
cation' exception of DR 7-102(B) is not applicable and disclosure may be required."
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 4, reprinted in 61
A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544 (1975).
62. The text of DR 4-101(C)(2) appears in note 56 supra.
63. This statement assumes, of course, that none of the other DR 4-101(C) excep-
tions applied. The text of DR 4-101(C) appears in note 56 supra.
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I. THE CURRENT RULE: WHEN MUST A LAWYER
REVEAL HIS CLIENT'S FRAUD?
A lawyer's ethical responsibility is generally defined and en-
forced by the supreme court of the state in which he practices."
Although the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility is widely rec-
ognized, the exact language of the various Disciplinary Rules varies
from state to state, 5 especially when the ABA has recently amended
a rule. Therefore, the scope of a lawyer's obligation to reveal infor-
mation concerning a fraud committed by his client will, in part,
depend on whether the 1974 amendment exempting privileged com-
munication from the DR 7-102(B)(1) disclosure duty has been
adopted in his jurisdiction."
A. STATES THAT HAVE NOT ADOPTED THE 1974 AMENDMENT
A lawyer practicing in a state that has not adopted the 1974
amendment to DR 7-102(B) (1) must conform his conduct to the origi-
nal version of that rule.'7 Under this standard, in order to determine
whether he has a duty to disclose, the lawyer must first determine
whether the information received clearly establishes that his client
has committed a fraud upon a person (or a tribunal)" during the
course of the representation. Such a determination will be hampered,
however, by the Code's failure to define any of its terms."
64. See generally 7 Am. JuR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 16 (1963).
65. [The Code] is not effective in any state in which a lawyer prac-
tices, unless it is officially adopted in such state. While the ABA Code has
been adopted in 49 states (California is the exception) and in the District of
Columbia, there are substantial variations in the text of the codes adopted
by many of the states.
R. WInE, LEGAL ETmcs xi (Supp. 1977).
66. Eight states have adopted the ABA's 1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B)(1):
Colorado, Connecticut, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, South Dakota, and
Tennessee. Telephone interview with Gary Green, Staff Assistant, ABA Committee
on Professional Responsibility (Apr. 26, 1977). New York has adopted a slightly dif-
ferent exception clause: "except when the information is protected as a confidence or
secret." Memo from Frederick C. Stimmel, Counsel, New York Bar Association, to
author (Nov. 18, 1976) (on file at MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW). Since several states are
currently cqnsidering adoption of the 1974 amendment, attorneys should contact their
own state bar association to determine whether it has recently been adopted in their
jurisdiction.
67. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmIUTY DR 7-102(B)(1)(amended
1974). The text of former DR 7-102(B)(1) appears in text accompanying note 33 supra.
68. Although the scope of this Note is limited to client fraud that injures another
person, see note 1 supra, the practicing attorney should be aware that the ABA Code
of Professional Responsibility also requires disclosure of client fraud perpetrated on a
tribunal. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RFsPONSxmLrry DR 7-102(B)(1).
69. Several of the most important words and phrases in DR 7-102(B)(1) have
been neither defined by the Code nor construed by the Ethics Committee. This Note
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The word "fraud," for example, can have a variety of meanings,
depending on the context in which it is used." The Code does not
define the term, and Opinion 341 indicates merely that an element
of scienter is necessary to establish fraud within the meaning of DR
7-102(B). 7' To this extent it would appear to parallel common law
fraud.72 But whether DR 7-102(B) fraud is coextensive with or goes
beyond common law fraud cannot be said with certainty." Similarly,
DR 7-102(B)(1) specifies that the fraud must have been committed
during "the course of the representation," but fails to describe the
limits such a requirement places on the disclosure duty. Presumably
it requires that the fraud occur during the existence of the lawyer-
client relationship and that the fraud relate to the subject matter of
that relationship. 4 If so, the first requirement would exempt from
mandatory disclosure information concerning a fraud committed by
the client before he retained the lawyer," while the subject-matter
attempts to interpret the questionable language in the most reasonable manner. Some
of the interpretations have been suggested by other commentators, and some are
original. None of them, however, is authoritative.
70. See, e.g., Fishman v. Thompson, 181 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965) ("taking unfair advantage of another to his injury which amounts to unconscion-
able overreaching"); Hildebrand v. Harrison, 361 P.2d 498, 505 (Okla. 1961) ("all the
multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one
individual to get an advantage over another"). Prosser criticizes the "indiscriminate
use of the word 'fraud,' a term so vague that it requires definition in nearly every case."
W. PROSSER, ToR § 105, at 684 (4th ed. 1971).
71. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs, OPINIONS, No. 341, slip op. at 5,
reprinted in 61 A.B.A.J. 1543, 1544 (1975) (dictum). The New York Bar Association
recently added definition 9 to its version of the Code. Definition 9 states that, for
DR 7-102 purposes, "fraud does not include conduct, although characterized as
fraudulent by statute or administrative rule, which lacks an element of scienter,
deceit, intent to mislead, or knowing failure to correct misrepresentations which can
be reasonably expected to induce detrimental reliance by another." Memo from
Frederick C. Stimmel, Counsel, New York Bar Association, to author (Nov. 18, 1976)
(on file at MINNESOTA LAW REviEW).
72. The essential elements of common law fraud are: (1) a false representation
of fact; (2) knowledge or belief that the representation is false; (3) an intention to
induce another to act or refrain from action in reliance on the representation; (4)
justifiable reliance by such person; and (5) damage resulting from such reliance. W.
PROSSER, supra note 70, § 105, at 685-86.
73. Since DR 7-102(B) does not specifically adopt the common law definition of
fraud, it would not be unreasonable for a court to interpret the term to include egre-
gious client misconduct that did not constitute common law fraud. For example, the
facts in Example 1, note 10 supra, do not constitute common law fraud because there
is no misrepresentation of fact by the guardian. Yet disclosure in this case has a
stronger intuitive appeal than it does in the others. See generally note 9 supra. It is
unclear why the lawyer's duty to disclose should be premised upon the injured party's
ability to sue the client in tort. But see Callan & David, supra note 10, at 359 (arguing
that DR 7-102(B)(1) should be construed narrowly to include only common law fraud).
74. See Callan & David, supra note 10, at 358 & n.113.
75. See generally note 1 supra.
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requirement would relieve the lawyer from having to disclose a fraud
that the client perpetrated outside of the professional relationship."
Finally, the Code does not define the term "clearly established." The
ABA House of Delegates, however, has adopted a resolution that if
the lawyer has a reasonable doubt whether a fraud was committed,
DR 7-102(B)(1) does not require him to do anything." A lawyer
who merely suspects-or even thinks it probable-that his client has
committed a fraud is under no obligation to investigate the situation
and verify his suspicions."'
If the lawyer's information does clearly establish that the client
has committed a fraud in the course of the representation, the lawyer
must call upon the client to right the injustice. If the client cannot
or will not do so, the lawyer is obligated to reveal the fraud to the
injured party, even if the lawyer's information is a confidence or
secret within the meaning of DR 4-101.11
B. STATES THAT HAvE ADOPTED THE 1974 AMENDMENT
A lawyer practicing in a state that has adopted the 1974 amend-
ment to DR 7-102(B)(1)0 must go one step further. He must first, of
course, decide whether his information clearly establishes that the
client has committed a fraud during the course of the representa-
tion.8 1' If it does not, he should not reveal anything., But if he deter-
mines that such a fraud has been committed, he must further decide
whether his information is protected as a privileged communication.
76. If, for example, the client retained the lawyer to represent him in a divorce
action and contemporaneously committed a contract fraud upon a third person, the
lawyer, upon discovering the fraud, would not be obligated to disclose it under DR 7-
102(B)(1) since it was not perpetrated in the course of the representation. To the extent
that DR 7-102(B)(1) is designed to deal with situations in which the lawyer has been
used to commit the fraud, see note 1 supra, these interpretations are consistent with
the underlying policy of the rule.
77. ABA HOUSE ACTbON, supra note 10, at 32.
78. Cf. Lipman, supra note 10, at 456 ("A strong suspicion based on limited
documentary evidence would probably not be sufficient to justify disclosure.. . . DR
7-102 ,would best be interpreted as not requiring lawyers to report fraud absent very
persuasive evidence of a client's wrongdoing."); Note, Attorney's Liability-Advising.
Abetting, and the SEC's National Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TEx. L. Rav. 1265.
1271 (1972) ("In deference to the strong social policy favoring an attorney's allegiance
to his client, even the strictest courts would likely impose the duty of disclosure only
when the lawyer was absolutely certain his client was violating the law. .
79. See notes 34-36 supra and accompanying text.
80. See note 66 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 68-78 supra.
82. It is significant that the Code allows the lawyer no discretion regarding dis-




As interpreted by Opinion 341, a privileged communication can
be either a confidence or a secret. A confidence is information pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege under applicable state law. 3
The scope of the privilege varies from state to state, 8' but it generally
protects anything that the client communicates to the lawyer in con-
fidence during the course of the professional relationship." Thus,
whenever the client himself admits or reveals the fraud to the lawyer,
the information, if it bears some relation to the purpose of representa-
tion, would be a privileged communication under the 1974 amend-
ment to DR 7-102(B)(1), and the lawyer would be forbidden to reveal
it.s A secret is any "other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client.""7 Presumably, disclosure of information
clearly establishing that he has committed a fraud would always be
either embarrassing or detrimental to the client. Therefore, the deter-
mination that such information is a secret hinges solely on whether
it was "gained in the professional relationship.""
Although this phrase is not defined by the Code, it apparently
describes both how and when the lawyer learned of the fraud: infor-
mation is presumably gained in the professional relationship if the
lawyer discovered it while acting for his client. Under this definition,
evidence clearly establishing client fraud would obviously be gained
in the professional relationship-and hence a secret-if the client
himself revealed it to the lawyer during a professional consultation,
83. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A). The text of DR 4-
101(A) appears in note 35 supra.
84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1976) ("An attorney cannot, without the
consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him
or his advice given thereon in the course of the professional duty .... ").
For a compilation of state attorney-client privilege rules, see 8 J. WiSIOIE,
EVIDENCE § 2292 & n.2. (McNaughton ed. 1971).
85. Wigmore's concise definition is an accurate representation of the general
scope of the privilege:
Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor in
his capacity as such, the communications relating to that purpose, made in
confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 84, § 2292, at 554 (footnotes omitted). See generally C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 52, §§ 87-97; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 84, §§ 2290-2329.
86. See, e.g., Example 1, note 10 supra.
87. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(A). The text of DR ,I.
101(A) appears in note 35 supra.
88. Whereas the phrase "in the course of the representation" describes how and
when the fraud was committed, see notes 74-76 supra and accompanying text, the
phrase "gained in the professional relationship" describes how and when the lawyer
learned of the fraud.
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even if the communication did not qualify as a confidence.8' Informa-
tion acquired by the lawyer in investigating the subject of the repre-
sentation would also be gained in the professional relationship." Fi-
nally, if a third person, knowing that the lawyer was representing the
client, voluntarily contacted the attorney and revealed information
about the client's fraud," the information would be gained in the
professional relationship 2 and hence a secret.
Thus, in a state that has adopted the 1974 amendment to DR 7-
102(B) (1), a lawyer must determine that he has received information
clearly establishing a fraud by the client during the course of the
representation and that he has received the information from outside
the professional relationship. Only if both of these independent re-
quirements are met would the attorney have an ethical obligation to
reveal the fraud, and then only after ascertaining that the client
would not remedy the situation himself.
C. PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF DR 7-102(B)(1)
It should be obvious from the foregoing discussion that after
Opinion 341 the interaction between the "privileged communication"
exception and the "clearly established" provision will leave DR 7-
102(B) (1) with virtually no practical effect. 3 Under the current inter-
89. If the client admitted the fraud to the lawyer in the presence of another
person, the attorney-client privilege would ordinarily not be applicable, see C. Mc-
CORmICK, supra note 52, § 91, at 187-91; thus the information would not be a "confi-
dence" under DR 4-101. But, since the information was received in the professional
relationship and would be embarrassing or detrimental to the client if disclosed, the
information would be a "secret." See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RasPoNSzaurrv DR
4-101. A partial text of DR 4-101 appears in note 35 supra.
90. For example, information gained by a lawyer while interviewing a third per-
son concerning the client's legal affairs would be a secret.
91. See, e.g., Examples 2 and 3, note lO.supra.
92. The crucial consideration in such a situation would be the third person's
purpose for contacting the lawyer. Since the informant contacted the lawyer because
he was the client's attorney, see, e.g., Example 2, note 10 supra, it follows that the
information was received in the professional relationship. Had the lawyer not been
representing the client, the informant would not have contacted him.
93. In order for the disclosure duty to arise, the information must clearly estab-
lish a fraud by the client and come to the lawyer's attention outside the professional
relationship. See notes 77-78 & 88-92 supra and accompanying text.
There would appear to be only four situations in which the lawyer's information
about his client's fraud could not reasonably be described as gained in the professional
relationship:
(1) a third party who was unaware of the attorney-client relationship hap-
pens to reveal the client's fraud to the lawyer; or
(2) the lawyer learns of the fraud accidentally (while reading the newspaper.
for example); or
(3) a third person, knowing of the attorney-client relationship, reveals the
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pretation, no disclosure duty arises if information received in the
course of the representation is embarrassing or detrimental to the
client. As noted earlier,94 information that even tends to establish a
client fraud will inevitably be embarrassing or potentially detrimen-
tal to the client and will almost always come to the lawyer's attention
during the course of the representation. Thus the privileged commu-
nication clause alone will prevent disclosure in the vast majority of
cases. In those few cases where information does come to the lawyer
from outside the professional relationship and is therefore not a privi-
leged communication, the requirement that the fraud be clearly es-
tablished will usually prevent disclosure. Because the lawyer will be
naturally inclined against revealing such information, he will un-
doubtedly view it with considerable skepticism in any event." The
"clearly established" requirement exacerbates that tendency by al-
lowing the lawyer to avoid the unpleasant disclosure duty merely by
disregarding any suspicions he may have about his client's miscon-
duct. 6 Finally, it appears that the two requirements may supplement
each other: the further the source of information is removed from the
professional relationship, the less likely it is to be convincing. 7 Thus,
client's fraud to the lawyer after that relationship has ended; or
(4) the client himself reveals the fraud to the lawyer after the professional
relationship has ended.
The reader may judge for himself how likely it is that information received in any
but the fourth of these situations could ever "clearly establish" fraud on the part of a
client. Moreover, the fourth situation entails a significant definitional problem: can it
reasonably be said that the professional relationship has ended when the client is still
revealing such sensitive information to the lawyer?
94. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
95. In order to make predictions about how DR 7-102(B)(1) works in practice, it
is necessary to make certain behavioristic assumptions about how lawyers react to the
client fraud quandary. It is obviously not in the lawyer's professional or pecuniary
interest to confront his client with evidence of his fraud or to reveal such information
to outsiders. Moreover, the lawyer is constrained against disclosure by the DR 4.101
duty of confidentiality: unless the DR 7-102(B)(1) duty clearly applies, the lawyer is
not only relieved of any duty to reveal, he has an affirmative duty not to reveal. A
lawyer who disclosed his client's fraud when he was not required to do so by DR 7-
102(B)(1) could conceivably find himself subject to disciplinary proceedings for violat.
ing DR 4-101. For these reasons, a lawyer discovering evidence of his client's fraud
would likely be inclined to avoid disclosure.
96. The "clearly established" language of DR 7-102(B) appears to contemplate
an objective standard: is the information received by the lawyer sufficient to clearly
establish that the client has committed a fraud? In view of the perplexing ethical
problem facing a lawyer in a client fraud situation, however, query whether a discipli-
nary tribunal would not be inclined to accept the lawyer's claim of ignorance at face
value, even if an objective inquiry would indicate that the client's fraud was clearly
established. A lawyer recognizing this implicit subjective standard might be even
more likely to disregard information indicating a fraud by his client.
97. In deciding whether his information clearly establishes fraud, the lawyer
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in many cases exactly those factors that take it outside of one require-
ment will bring it within the other. Since the lawyer may not reveal
information when either of these factors is present, it is difficult even
to hypothesize a realistic situation in which the duty to report would
arise.
Since 1928, the ABA's codes of professional conduct have in-
cluded provisions that purport to impose upon lawyers an ethical
duty to reveal certain information concerning a client's fraudulent
actions. This history suggests that, at least in the abstract, lawyers
feel that their professional ethics require a rule mandating disclosure
of such information. On the other hand, the ABA has so limited the
scope of that duty that today it retains little, if any, vitality. It is
absurd for the Code to contain a rule wholly lacking in substantive
effect. DR 7-102(B)(1) should be either repealed or revised so that it
has some operative significance.
I IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICTING POLICIES
UNDERLYING THE CLIENT FRAUD DILEMMA-SHOULD A
LAWYER REVEAL CLIENT FRAUD?
It is only by disclosure that a lawyer can effectively seek to rem-
edy the harm done by his client's fraud. 8 It would appear, therefore,
that in any situation in which countervailing legal or policy consider-
ations do not dictate otherwise, a rule mandating disclosure of such
frauds would be an ethical necessity. Indeed, that the legal profession
has always recognized the truth of this proposition is evidenced by
the inclusion of such rules in both the Canons of Ethics and the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Yet, just as consistently, those rules
have been weakened until they are little more than curiosities. This
erosion has been justified by two principles which, though often con-
flated, are nevertheless distinct: the attorney-client privilege and the
more general principle of confidentiality. In fact, neither of these
principles prohibits disclosure in a client fraud context.
Although the attorney-client privilege is commonly believed to
prohibit a lawyer from revealing information about his client's
fraud," a clear understanding of the privilege reveals that this view
must consider its source. The more reliable the information, the more likely it is that
it will qualify as being received in the professional relationship. See note 93 supra.
98. See notes 4-6 supra and accompanying text.
99. According to Opinion 341, the adoption of the 1974 amendment to DR 7-
102(B)(1) was based on this reasoning. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra. The
confusion in this regard is perhaps understandable, inasmuch as most commentators
who have addressed the issue have made the same error. See, e.g.. H. DRINKER, LEcAL
ETmcs, 28 n.29, 132 n.25, 135 n.43 (1953); Callan & David, supra note 10. at 340 n.40,
360 & n.122; Goldberg, supra note 10, at 302-06. But see Note, The Lauwyer-Client
Privilege: Its Application to Corporations, the Role of Ethics, and Its Possible
Curtailment, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 235, 249-56 (1961).
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misconstrues both its purpose and its effect. Where applicable, 110 the
attorney-client privilege allows the client to prevent the lawyer from
answering a question, in a judicial context, that the lawyer would
otherwise be compelled to answer. Like the other evidentiary privi-
leges, the client's privilege, when asserted, acts "to shut off inquiry
to pertinent facts in court . . . ."10 On the most literal level, there-
fore, the privilege does not apply where the lawyer proposes to reveal
information about his client's fraud to the injured party since there
is no tribunal compelling the lawyer to testify.' 2 More fundamen-
tally, however, the privilege simply does not exist where the client has
used the attorney to commit a fraud.
Since the policy of the privilege is that of promoting the admin-
istration of justice, it would be a perversion of the privilege to extend
it to the client who seeks advice to aid him in carrying out. . . [a]
fraudulent scheme. . . .Accordingly, it is settled under modern
authority that the privilege does not extend to communications be-
tween attorney and client where the client's purpose is the further-
ance of a future intended . . . fraud.'0
Thus, the privilege does not present a legal impediment to any
proposed mandatory duty to disclose client fraud to the injured
party.' 4 Unfortunately, the irrelevance of the privilege to the client
100. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
101. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 52, § 87, at 175 (emphasis added).
102. "As a rule of evidence, the lawyer-client privilege, whether in common-law
or statutory form, operates only when the attorney is under compulsion to give testi-
mony or produce documents." Note, supra note 99, at 249.
103. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 52, § 95, at 199. See FED. R. EVID. 502(d)(1)
(proposed but not adopted); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 212 (1942); UNIFORM RULE
OF EVIDENCE 502(d)(1).
104. Some commentators have argued that the attorney-client privilege extends
to nontestimonial situations, based on a line of cases holding lawyers liable in tort (on
a theory akin to deceit) for revealing confidential communications of the client to a
third person. See, e.g., Callan & David, supra note 10, at 340 n.40. These cases,
however, all involved deceitful conduct by the attorney, not the client. Courts have
held lawyers liable for disclosing client confidences only in situations where the law-
yer's conduct amounted to a gross breach of his fiduciary duty to the client. The
leading case is Taylor v. Blacklow, 132 Eng. Rep. 401 (C.P. 1836). There, the defendant
lawyer had been retained by the plaintiff to arrange financing secured by a certain
tract of plaintiff's land. The lawyer, while inspecting the abstracts, discovered a minor
defect in plaintiff's title, in favor of a third person, A. The lawyer went to A and
suggested that A retain him to sue the plaintiff in ejectment. The plaintiff, after
successfully defending the ejectment suit, brought a tort action against the lawyer. The
court held the lawyer liable for damages to the plaintiff, reasoning that there had been
a gross breach of the fiduciary duty owed the client by the lawyer. The court specifi-
cally declined to hold the lawyer liable for a violation of the attorney-client privilege,
explaining that the privilege did not apply to a voluntary out of court disclosure.
Accord, In re Boone, 83 F. 944 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897) (applying the gross breach of
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fraud disclosure dilemma has rarely been recognized.ca This may
account for the difficulty the bar has experienced in attempting to
deal with this issue.' 0
Although the attorney-client privilege does not bar the lawyer's
revelation of his client's fraud to the injured party, it can be argued
that the related principle of lawyer-client confidentiality,' long rec-
ognized as an essential part of the lawyer's role in our adversary
system of justice, should override the ethical imperative in favor of
disclosure:
The lawyer can serve effectively as advocate, however, "only if
he knows all that his client knows" concerning the facts of the case
Obviously, however, the client cannot be expected to reveal to
the lawyer all information that is potentially relevant, including
that which may well be incriminating, unless the client can be as-
sured that the lawyer will maintain all such information in the
strictest confidence. "The purposes and necessities of the relation
between a client and his attorney" require "the fullest and freest
disclosures" of the client's "objects, motives and acts". If the attor-
ney were permitted to reveal such disclosures, it would be "not only
a gross violation of a sacred trust upon his part", but it would
"utterly destroy and prevent the usefulness and benefits to be de-
rived from professional assistance". . . . Destroy that confidence,
and "a man would not venture to consult any skillful person, or
would only dare to tell his counselor half his case". The result would
duty standard to hold a lawyer liable for revealing his client's confidences).
These cases have been relied on for the proposition that a lawyer's disclosure of
his client's misconduct could result in the lawyer being held liable for damages. It is
difficult, however, to see how the gross breach of duty analysis in Taylor and Boone
could be applied to the lawyer's revelation of his client's fraud to the injured party.
105. See note 99 supra and accompanying text. See also Responsibility of Law-
yers Advising Management-Panel Discussion, Bus. LAw., March 1975, at 13, 20 (Vol.
30, Special Issue) ("[W]e ought not to put a lawyer in a position of being required by
the Code to divulge confidential communications if the state law provided he couldn't
do so.") But no state law provides that a lawyer cannot divulge to the injured party
confidential communications concerning his client's fraud. One state statute does
forbid a lawyer to testify in court concerning the content of confidential communica-
tions from his client. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-307 (1955). This, of course, does not
prevent revelation of similar information to the injured party.
106. The evolution of the ABA's client fraud standards is discussed in Part II
of this Note.
107. "The evidentiary privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose confidences
both arise from the need to encourage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent informa-
tion to their attorneys. . . ." E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 394 (S.D.
Tex. 1969). The ethical duty not to disclose confidences is codified in ABA COnE oF




be impairment of the "perfect freedom of consultation by client with
attorney", which is "essential to the administration of justice".,"
In the situation of a completed client fraud, however, these argu-
ments miss the point. The client, after all, has already chosen not to
tell the lawyer all he knows; he has disclaimed an interest in a full
disclosure of his "objects, motives and acts" by hiding his fraudulent
intent from the lawyer. Moreover, the purpose of encouraging full
disclosure by the client is to assure that the lawyer can be fully
effective in achieving all that his client is, in justice or law, entitled
to receive. It is not intended to protect the client's effort to achieve
an unjust or illegal advantage over a third party. That a lawyer who
attempts to rectify a fraud his client has used him to commit could
be castigated for "a gross violation of a sacred trust" is ludicrous.
Although the policies behind the tradition of lawyer-client confiden-
tiality are valid in general, they simply do not make sense when the
client has used the professional relationship to perpetrate a fraud.
Moreover, the ABA Code recognizes that the principle of lawyer-
client confidentiality is not absolute. The Code lists several situations
in which a lawyer may reveal his client's confidences and secrets.
These situations may be divided into two groups, each with its own
rationale. First, a lawyer may disclose to the proper authorities his
client's intention to commit a crime and any further information
necessary to prevent its commission."' Apparently, the drafters of the
Code thought that in such situations the danger to potential victims
of the crime justified a breach of confidentiality. Second, a lawyer
may reveal confidences or secrets necessary to collect his fee, "' or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against accusations of
wrongful conduct."' It would seem, in such cases, that the profes-
sional relationship has so deteriorated-or been so betrayed by the
client-that the rule of confidentiality should no longer apply.
When a client has used his lawyer to perpetrate a fraud, both
rationales justifying an exception to the general principle of confiden-
tiality are applicable. In most client fraud situations, only the client
and the lawyer will be aware of the fraud. Assuming the client will
not voluntarily admit the deception to the injured party, the fraud
will remain concealed and thus unremedied unless the lawyer reveals
what he knows to the injured party. Thus, there is a strong need for
108. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 4-5 (footnotes omitted).
109. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3).
110. Id. DR 4-101(C)(4). It is curious that a lawyer is forbidden to reveal confid-
ences in order to rectify a fraud he helped perpetrate, yet is allowed to disclose the
same information in order to collect his fee.
111. Id. See also Comment, ABA Code of Professional Responsibility: An Attor-
neys Right to Self Defense, 40 Mo. L. REv. 327 (1975).
[Vol. 62:89
CLIENT FRAUD
disclosure in this situation, just as there is when the client is about
to commit a crime. Moreover, a client who conceals his fraudulent
purposes from the lawyer until after the deception is completed has
betrayed the professional relationshii on which the principle of confi-
dentiality is based. Therefore, like the situation where the client
refuses to pay his bill or lodges an accusation against the lawyer, the
client who has used the lawyer to commit a fraud has no right to rely
on the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.
The various arguments advanced against the disclosure of client
fraud all fail on a central premise. The policy reasons offered for the
proposition that lawyers should not disclose client misconduct all
assume that the lawyer and the client are operating within a func-
tional adversary system. In an adversary system, however, it is
axiomatic that both sides, represented by competent counsel, come
together before an impartial tribunal and follow the same rules. If
both sides observe the rules, more often than not justice is done. In a
client fraud situation, however, one party has intentionally used part
of the system of justice against the system itself. He has chosen not
to play by the established rules. He cannot then complain when, in
order to rectify the fraud he has perpetrated, his lawyer is compelled
to disregard the right to confidentiality he would ordinarily have.
V. CONCLUSION
The current ABA standard concerning client fraud allows the
unscrupulous client to abuse the attorney-client relationship with
impunity. If the lawyer discovers the fraud before it is consummated,
he will, at most, withdraw from the representation. On the other
hand, if the client is clever enough to conceal the fraud until after it
is completed, he is assured that the lawyer can reveal the information
only by subjecting himself to disciplinary proceedings under DR 4-
101. This is an entirely unsatisfactory result.
A lawyer who has been used by his client to commit a fraud is
under an ethical obligation to help rectify the injustice. Only by
disclosing the fraud to the injured party will the lawyer be able to
fulfill that obligation. DR 7-102(B) should, therefore, be amended to
reflect that judgment by imposing upon the lawyer who discovers
evidence of his client's fraud a mandatory duty to disclose the fraud
to the injured person:
Proposed DR 7-102(B)
If a lawyer discovers that his client has perpetrated a
fraud upon another person during the course of the represen-
tation, he shall promptly advise the client to rectify the situa-
tion. If the client does not immediately do so, the lawyer shall
reveal the fraud to the injured person. In such a situation the
duties prescribed in DR 4-101 shall not apply.
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This proposal adapts the language of the current rule to alleviate
several of the problems discussed in this Note. First, fraud upon a
tribunal is excluded from mandatory disclosure. Inasmuch as fraud
perpetrated upon a tribunal presents different ethical issues than
does fraud upon a person,"2 it is perhaps inappropriate for one broad
disclosure rule to deal with both situations."' Second, the "clearly
established" language of the current rule has been replaced by a less
demanding standard. The tendency of the "clearly established" stan-
dard to provide a rationale for ignoring evidence of client fraud"'
makes it inappropriate for the purposes of this rule. The "discovers"
standard, because of its vagueness, will not allow a lawyer to dismiss
so easily any qualms he may have about his client's apparent miscon-
duct. The proposed rule purposely places a lawyer who suspects that
his client may have committed a fraud in an uncomfortable position.
It is hoped that this may prompt the attorney to investigate the
situation further in order to alleviate his doubts about his client's
conduct. There is, of course, a good reason for not imposing a disclo-
sure duty on the lawyer who is not sure that his client has committed
a fraud. If, notwithstanding the lawyer's suspicions, the client is in
fact innocent of wrongdoing, disclosure would be inappropriate."'
This possibility, however, is negated by requiring the lawyer to dis-
cuss his suspicions with the client before disclosing anything. If the
lawyer was mistaken about the client's culpability, the client himself
will presumably be able to assuage the lawyer's doubts."'6 Finally, the
proposed rule eliminates the privileged communication exception
and adds a provision making the disclosure duty controlling over the
general principle of confidentiality. Since the policy considerations
that generally underlie lawyer-client confidentiality are overborne by
conflicting policies favoring disclosure of client fraud,"7 the fact that
certain information subject to the proposed duty to reveal may be a
confidence or a secret under DR 4-101 becomes irrelevant.
Adoption of the proposed rule by the ABA and scrupulous adher-
ence thereto by individual lawyers would likely have several salutary
consequences. First, since the client will always be consulted first and
112. See note 17 supra.
113. This is not necessarily meant to suggest that a lawyer should not be required
to reveal a fraud committed by his client upon a tribunal, but rather that such a
situation deserves separate analytical treatment.
114. See notes 95-96 supra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text.
116. It is theoretically possible that a client, although innocent, might be unable
to satisfactorily explain the facts underlying the lawyer's suspicions. This seems un-
likely to occur. In such a situation, however, the lawyer would not, so long as his
suspicions remain unconfirmed, be required to disclose any information.
117. See text accompanying notes 107-11 supra.
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advised to correct the situation himself, a lawyer will rarely be forced
to reveal anything. The client will realize that if he does not rectify
the fraud, the lawyer will. It is likely, therefore, that the client, recog-
nizing that the fraud will be revealed in any event, would prefer to
remedy the matter privately rather than to subject himself to poten-
tial legal action arising from the lawyer's revelations to the injured
party. Second, to the extent that the client is aware of the lawyer's
duty to reveal any fraud he discovers, the client may be less likely
to engage in such conduct in the first place."" It may, in fact, be
conducive to the establishment of a proper professional relationship
for the lawyer, at the moment he first suspects that his professional
skills are being misused, to tell the client frankly, "I am ethically
bound to keep everything you tell me in the strictest confidence.
But if you use this relationship to injure someone else, I am bound
to reveal it." Finally, if the proposed rule is adopted, the importance
of the lawyer's role as an officer of justice will be reaffirmed, both in
the minds of clients and of lawyers themselves.
This last consideration is both important and timely, and it
raises problems of which the client fraud dilemma is only a small
part. The legal profession's claim *to integrity is at best viewed with
skepticism. If that claim is to be vindicated, the bar must convince
the public that there are certain things a lawyer cannot and will not
do, even for his client. Yet the profession's codification of its ethical
duties-the Code of Professional Responsibility-is itself plagued
with ethical anomalies. Commentators have attacked it as irrelevant,
internally inconsistent, and conspiratorial;"' self-serving;'" and am-
118. It has been argued, however, that a mandatory disclosure duty would be
destructive of the delicate trust relationship which is essential between lawyer and
client. A particular client, fearing disclosure, might fail to confide in his lawyer, think-
ing, perhaps erroneously, that an action or transaction he wishes to pursue might
constitute fraud. Although this argument depends on several significant and perhaps
unverifiable assumptions about the client's perception of the lawyer's ethical responsi-
bilities, it raises a reasonable objection. The proposed disclosure rule admittedly could
have a chilling effect on lawyer-client confidentiality in several situations. For exam-
ple, if the client retained a lawyer to accomplish a certain objective, suspecting it may
involve fraud, the client's presumed fear of disclosure may prompt him to conceal
material information from the lawyer. The effectiveness of the professional relationship
would thus be inhibited, and if the client's desired goal is actually not fraudulent, he
may forfeit a deserved recovery or transaction. Similarly, assuming a continuing
lawyer-client relationship, if the client bad in the past used the lawyer to commit a
fraud and the facts of that deception were crucial to his current legitimate transaction.
the client would have to choose between foregoing a proper objective and giving the
lawyer information he would be obligated to reveal. Such situations, however, are
likely to occur so rarely in practice that they can and should be accepted as negligible
costs of the ethically proper course of disclosure.
. 119. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 702, 702 & n.5 (1977).
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biguous.1'2 The Supreme Court has recently declared one of its provi-
sions unconstitutional.' While deficiencies of this last kind can be
remedied by the courts, most of the problems inherent in the Code
can only be corrected by the bar itself. Disparities between the profes-
sion's ethical standards and the behavior of particular lawyers will
undoubtedly continue to exist, but if the profession cannot even pre-
scribe rules that accord with society's ethical perceptions, there is
little hope that its activities will be viewed with anything but cyni-
cism.
It is hoped that lawyers will recognize their responsibility to
impose upon themselves standards of conduct that will "uphold the
integrity and honor of [the] profession."'1 But those who find such
arguments unconvincing may nevertheless be persuaded that reform
is a political necessity:
The profession does not have much time remaining to reform its own
disciplinary structure. Public dissatisfaction is increasing. Proposals
for public participation in the disciplinary process already have
been made and, in at least one instance, have been implemented.
Unless the profession as a whole is itself prepared to initiate radical
reforms promptly, fundamental changes in the disciplinary struc-
ture, imposed by those outside the profession, can be expected.',
Adoption by the ABA of the client fraud disclosure rule proposed
herein would be an important step in the process of ethical reform.
With the enactment of proposals such as this, the Code would add
substance to its claim that "so long as its practitioners are guided by
these principles, the law will continue to be a noble profession."' 22
120. Id. at 704.
121. Note, Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A New Approach, 4 HOFSTRA L. REV.
685, 688 (1976).
122. See Bates v. State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 2691, 2700 (1977) (holding that DR 2-
101(B), as applied to newspaper publication of truthful advertisements concerning fees
for routine legal services, violated the first amendment by inhibiting the free flow of
commercial information).
123. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9.6.
124. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLI-
NARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 8-
9 (Final Draft June 1970).
125. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-6.
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